![]() ![]() Īlthough the battle that started at 73 Easting continued on the 27th and engulfed components from the Republican Guard’s Medina, Adnan and Hammurabi Divisions, and the remainder of the 12th Armored Division, this post examines primarily the tactical and operational circumstances of the Battle at 73 Easting between VII Corps and the Tawakalna Division, on 26th February. ![]() The ground phase of the campaign commenced on the 24th, with the advance of VII (armour) and XVIII (airborne) Corps through the desert, combined with Joint Forces Command-North & East, and Marine Forces Central Command, operations to secure Kuwait and Kuwait City. When President Bush’s ultimatum of February 23rd expired, the Coalition launched its massive offensive, with the expectation of a confrontation with Iraq’s Republican Guard shortly to follow. The actions occurred on the afternoon, and evening of 26th February, 1991, around the 73rd easting grid coordinate, near Objective Norfolk west of the Kuwait-Iraq border. Keeping this route open was crucial, as was closing it to prevent Iraq’s Army from escaping. On February 26th, VII Corps’ mechanized units encountered the Republican Guard and three of its own mechanized divisions, deployed to protect the flank of Iraq’s withdrawal corridor through Basra. ![]() After crossing into Iraq on 24 February, the Coalition’s armoured and airborne forces raced across the desert to locate and engage Iraq’s Republican Guard, known to be holding positions near the border with Kuwait. Two days into the coalition ground war in Kuwait and Iraq, Phase IV of Operation Desert Storm, the armour of Third Army’s VII Corps attacked Iraq’s Republican Guard and other armour brigades in a series of battles, forty-one hours in duration, that commenced with the Battle at 73 Easting. ![]() Tank tactics at the Battle of 73rd Easting: February 26, 1991. ![]()
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